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This  paper  assesses  the  impact  of  Swedish  welfare-to-work  programmes  on  labour 
market performance including wages, labour market status, unemployment duration and 
future welfare-to-work participation.  We develop a structural dynamic model of labour 
supply which incorporates detailed institutional features of these policies and allows for 
selection on observables and unobservables.  We estimate the model from a rich admin­
istrative panel data set and show that training programmes - which account for a large 
proportion of programmes - have little eﬀect on future outcomes, whereas job experience 
programmes have a beneﬁcial eﬀect. 
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1  Introduction 
Active labour market programmes have become increasingly important in a number of OECD 
countries as a way of combating unemployment and helping workers reallocate to new sectors 
in the wake of economic shocks.  Such programmes have indeed become the centrepiece for 
UK employment policy through the ”New Deal” introduced in 1998,  and have been a well 
established institution in Sweden, where there has been a strong link with beneﬁt eligibility. 
In one form or another they have also been an important presence in the US, with programmes 
such as the JTPA or other smaller scale training programmes.  However, the success of such 
programmes is controversial, with a large number of evaluations putting in doubt their overall 
eﬀectiveness.  Nevertheless, the programmes considered are highly heterogeneous, comprising 
anything from job-search assistance, to training and subsidised work. 
There is an extensive body of evidence from micro-econometric studies on the eﬀects of var­
ious types of programmes on participants’ subsequent labour market outcomes. Evidence from 
diﬀerent OECD countries shows that subsidised employment has a greater impact than public 
training (for which negative eﬀects have at times been estimated). Recent work comparing the 
eﬀectiveness of the four options of the New Deal for Young People in the UK similarly ﬁnds 
that the employment option performs best compared to full-time education and training, the 
voluntary sector and the environmental task force (Bonjour et al., 2001; Dorsett, 2006).  The 
ﬁnding that the ’work ﬁrst’ approach of the employment programme dominates the human 
capital approach of the training measure is also in line with the meta-analysis of US welfare­
to-work programmes by Greenberg et al.  (2004).  Using similar data as in this paper and 
based on a non-parametric matching approach, Sianesi (2001a,b) ﬁnds that those programmes 
providing subsidised workplace experience and on-the-job training at an employer are not only 
cheaper, but considerably more eﬀective for participants’ subsequent labour market success 
than classroom training courses. 
The focus of traditional empirical approaches to evaluation (reviewed extensively in Heck­
3 man et al., 1999) is mostly on statistical robustness; seeking to identify causal eﬀects without 
functional-form restrictions, they typically rely on conditional independence assumptions or 
the availability of instrumental variables or direct randomisation. Considering mainly reduced­
form models and lacking economic structure, the conventional treatment eﬀect literature is es­
sentially static. However, labour market choices are intrinsically dynamic as current decisions 
aﬀect future outcomes and expected future outcomes aﬀect current decisions.  To understand 
how programmes operate on employment and unemployment durations and on earnings, and 
to be in a position to study policy reforms the underlying dynamics have to be modelled. 
To achieve this we need to model selection into the (diﬀerent) programmes and into sub­
sequent employment (cf.  Ham and Lalonde, 1996) as economic decisions.  Moreover, we need 
to account for the incentive structure generated by the institutional framework. For example, 
labour market institutions such as the Swedish one (or those of many European countries) add 
to the dynamic nature of the problem in two ways:  ﬁrst, by having a large set of diﬀerent 
programmes from which to choose from and second, by linking programme participation to 
the renewal of eligibility to unemployment beneﬁts. 
To deal with these issues, we develop a dynamic structural model to assess the impact of 
a complex welfare-to-work system taking into account how it aﬀects working and future pro­
gramme participation incentives. We model labour supply decisions, programme participation 
decisions and earnings, taking into account the institutional features, in particular the eligi­
bility to unemployment insurance and its renewal through programme participation or work. 
We allow for selection on unobserved heterogeneity and model explicitly the dynamic selection 
choices of forward-looking and optimizing individuals. 
We  estimate  the  diﬀerential  impact  of  each  type  of  programme  or  of  sequences  of  pro­
grammes, the short- and long-term eﬀects, and the eﬀects on ﬁnal and on intermediate out­
comes. We estimate the mean and the full distribution of treatment eﬀects. In the presence of 
selection into the programmes based on (unobserved) returns, the average eﬀects uncovered by 
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reduced-form methods may mask important heterogeneity in impacts by types of individuals. 
Thus the aim of this paper is to provide a uniﬁed framework for evaluating programmes, 
recognising their dynamic eﬀects and intertemporal incentives and considering the longer term 
impacts on individual careers,  including employment and unemployment durations,  welfare 
dependency  and  wages.  In  doing  so  we  specify  a  model  that  is  capable  of  simulating  the 
eﬀects of reforms to the existing system.  Thus our approach diﬀers from the recent spate of 
evaluations in that we seek to specify and estimate a dynamic economic model of programme 
participation, employment and wages. This model is capable both of oﬀering an evaluation of 
existing programmes and of simulating the eﬀects of alternative policies. 
The Swedish labour market programmes have been considered before1, though never in such 
a systematic way as we propose here.  Furthermore, we have put together a detailed data set 
which follows a cohort of unemployed for a number of years. The employment status data has 
been linked to earnings records allowing us to follow career outcomes of workers for a number 
of years, free from recall bias. 
We ﬁnd that training programmes seem to have no beneﬁcial impact on the treated. On the 
contrary, they postpone exit from unemployment due to the lock-in eﬀect, whereby treated are 
deterred from moving into employment while on the programme, which can be used to renew 
unemployment insurance eligibility. Subsidised employment seems to be more beneﬁcial, par­
ticularly to high ability individuals.  First, it speeds up transitions into employment although 
not enough to recover from the lock-in eﬀect. Second, it seems to have some impact on wages 
although less than usual job experience.  And third, treated individuals of high ability enjoy 
longer employment spells after treatment. 
The next section discusses the Swedish institutional context, the essence of which we try to 
capture in our dynamic structural model, and describes the data used in our analysis. Section 3 
sets up the model. Section 4 presents the estimated eﬀects of treatment and section 5 discusses 
1e.g. Forslund and Krueger (1997) and Sianesi (2001a,b and 2004). 
5 the predicted outcomes of alternative policy scenarios. Finally section 6 concludes the paper. 
2  Data and institutional background 
2.1  The Swedish labour market policy 
Sweden runs one of the world’s most generous welfare policies targeted at the unemployed. We 
brieﬂy describe the prevalent and most relevant features of Swedish labour market institutions 
of the late nineties (1996-1998, corresponding to the time period covered by the data) that will 
set the ground for our model. 
Unemployment insurance (UI) in Sweden amounts to 80% of the individuals salary in the 
previous job up to a ceiling of about SEK16,500 per month.  To ﬁrst become eligible to 14 
months of UI beneﬁts, an individual needs to have worked for a minimum of 80 days over 5 
calendar months during the previous 12 months.2  After meeting such requirement, eligibility 
to UI can always be renewed through an additional 80 days over 5 calendar months of work or 
treatment through one or more of the many programmes oﬀered to the unemployed. 
There are a great number of alternative treatments being oﬀered at any time to unemployed 
individuals, in particular job subsidies, trainee replacement schemes, vocational labour market 
training (AMU), relief work, and work practice schemes (including work experience replace­
ment, ALU, and workplace introduction, API). In this paper we distinguish between subsidised 
employment, which includes the ﬁrst two treatments mentioned above, and all the other pro­
grammes in assessing their diﬀerential impact on labour market performance. In what follows, 
the latter will be called training programmes.  3 
2There is also a membership condition, requiring payment of the (almost negligible) membership fees to the 
UI fund for at least 12 months prior to the claim. However, opting out of membership seems to be a rare event 
and we deal with UI membership as if it was compulsory. 
3Although alternative aggregate rules could have been used and argued for, our choice was to classify the 
programmes according to their compensation regime as this reﬂects their relative closeness to the labour market. 
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There have been numerous policy changes although the 1996-1998 period has been remark­
ably stable.  Notwithstanding, reforms occurred in July 1997, regarding the eligibility rules 
to unemployment compensation, and in September 1997, regarding the compensation level. 
These have been minor changes and we disregard them in the model. Perhaps the major pol­
icy change after our observational time window occurred in February 2001 when the possibility 
to renew eligibility to UI through programme participation was abolished.  Using our model 
and results, we will assess the potential impacts of such policy change.4 
2.2  Data 
This  section  brieﬂy  discusses  the  main  data  related  issues.  More  details  can  be  found  in 
Appendix C. 
Data  sources  The data set we use is drawn from four diﬀerent administrative data sets 
which have been merged for the purpose of the study: 
•	 The Unemployment Register H¨ andel provides information from August 1991 onwards on 
unemployment spells, programme participation spells and the subsequent labour market 
status of those who are deregistered (e.g.  employment,  education,  inactivity or ‘lost’ 
(attrition)). 
•	 The Akstat data base provides information on unemployment compensation from January 
1994 onwards. 
•	 The Kontrolluppgifts-registry  provides employment information by employer from Jan­
uary 1990 onwards.  This is employer provided data for tax purposes and is reported 
A ﬁner classiﬁcation could have disclosed more detailed information about the programmes and will be the 
subject of further work. 
4In future work we plan to explore the use of the most relevant policy changes to validate a structural 
model. 
7 yearly.  It includes the period of employment and the total earnings (which we also des­
ignate by wages) over the period by employer.  Reported earnings are equally split over 
working period on a monthly basis.  These are total earnings,  not adjusted for hours 
worked. 
•	 The Sysreg dataset provides information on educational achievement (highest educational 
level) by calendar year, starting in 1990. 
The diﬀerent data sets are merged together using the individual’s unique social security 
number. The data cover the whole working age population in Sweden. 
Sample  selection  From  the  data  we  select  the  group  individuals  becoming  unemployed 
during 1996 and follow them up to December 1998.  For simplicity, we focus on a relatively 
homogeneous group.  Selection was ruled by two main criteria:  (i)  the relative importance 
of  the  group  in  terms  of  size  and  expected  returns  from  treatment  and  (ii)  the  nature  of 
the decision process among the individuals of the group.  Our ﬁnal sample is composed of 
individuals with the following characteristics: 
•	 Males - by excluding females we avoid having to deal with fertility decisions. 
•	 Unskilled - these are disproportionately represented among the unemployed. We choose 
individuals having completed no more than 1 to 2 years of high school and not upgrading 
during the observation period (this is true for 95% of the unskilled population of the age 
group being considered - see below). 
•	 Aged  26  to  30  at  the  time  of  their  sample  inﬂow  - young  individuals  have  been  the 
object of attention of both policies and empirical research for two reasons: (i) they are to 
become the major labour force group in the near future and (ii) their perceived plasticity 
facilitates learning and adaptation to new conditions or environments. We focused on a 
young group outside the educational years to avoid dealing with the educational decisions. 
8 •  Not disabled or self-employed - these individuals face diﬀerent conditions and policies. 
Using  these  selection  criteria,  our  data  set  contains  14,370  individuals  who  all  start  an 
unemployment spell in 1996.  From these data we have excluded individuals for whom the 
information from the unemployment register and from the employer is incompatible.  These 
are individuals who have a relatively long history of past employment as derived from the 
employer-provided data, but who are not eligible for unemployment beneﬁts as detailed in the 
unemployment registry data. About 20% of the sample has been excluded on these grounds.5 
We have also dropped individuals eligible to unemployment insurance at sample inﬂow but with 
no previous employment history.  These amount to less then 2% of the sample.  Estimation 
used a randomly selected 20% sub-sample of these cleaned and selected data. 
Labour  market  activity  In each calendar month from inﬂow to December 1998, the in­
dividual’s activity is classiﬁed in one of the four alternatives:  employment, unemployment, 
subsidised employment or training programme.  When more than one activity is present in 
any given month, we selected the one that lasted longest in that month.  Since the employer­
provided data is not as reliable as the unemployment register, we gave preference to unem­
ployment information in case of conﬂict. This means that employment is the residual activity 
whenever a positive wage is simultaneously observed. 
We do not distinguish between part- and full-time employment.  While on part-time em­
ployment, individuals may still be entitled to UI (a share of the full amount) and have priority 
access to treatment as compared to unregistered individuals. However, part-time employment 
contributes towards renewing UI eligibility, just as full time employment does.  We therefore 
decided to classify both types of jobs in the “employment” state. 
5Although membership to UI funds is voluntary and is a pre-requisite to eligibility, it is unlikely that it 
explains this disparity between eligibility and employment history as the number of workers that opt out from 
UI funds seems to be small. 
9 Programme occurrences were only considered if in long spells, deﬁned as lasting for more 
than 2 months.  In such case, treatment spells are split in 4 months periods and considered 
as sequences of treatment events. While such simpliﬁcation reduces the dimensionality of our 
problem, it also corresponds to the patterns found in the data. Descriptive analysis has shown 
that the duration of the treatment spells peaks at 3 to 4 months.6 
However rich and eﬀective the data is in following individuals over their working life,  it 
sometimes  happens  that  we  lose  contact  with  one  individual  in  a  given  month  during  our 
observational time window, meaning that the agent is neither registered as unemployed, in 
a treatment spell or in paid work.  This may happen because,  for example,  the individual 
moves into education, out of the country or into inactivity (unregistered unemployment). We 
censor the history of aﬀected individuals from that moment onwards. This aﬀects 30% of the 
individuals in the sample. 
Variables  Based on the historical information back to 1990, we constructed a number of 
variables to characterise the individuals’ state:  (i)  working experience, which is simply the 
cumulated  number  of  months  in  employment  since  January  1990;  (ii)  remaining  eligibility 
to UI in months, which varies from 0 to 14, is used up while in unemployment and can be 
recovered through employment or programme participation; and (iii) the criterion to renew 
full eligibility to UI (14 months), which measures the time in work or treatment since the last 
unemployment spell. 
6It should be noticed that although the policy requirement to renew UI eligibility is 5 months in either 
employment or treatment, we will use a 4-month rule in the model discussed below.  Such choice reﬂects the 
diﬀerent criteria used by the employment services and in our study in measuring time in each labour market 
status.  Calendar months are used in both cases.  As explained before, the employment services require the 
agent to work for 80 days over 5 months, meaning that in some of these months the agent may work for as 
little as 1 day. Our criterion, however, is to use the predominant labour market status over the calendar month 
and to require 4 months of employment/treatment. By being more demanding, our measure will under-predict 
the accumulated experience towards renewing eligibility. 
10 2.3  Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides a brief summary of the whole data (column (1)), the data excluding individuals 
with incompatible information from the employer and unemployment registry (column (2)) and 
the 20% sub-sample we use in estimation (column (3)). There seems to be no important sample 
selection problems created by our cleaning and selection rules. For all variables, including the 
ones that reﬂect the individuals’ behaviour throughout our observation window such as the 
average duration of the ﬁrst unemployment spell and the average number of unemployment 
and employment spells, the three samples show very similar patterns. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
full sample  20% subsample 
all observ.  excl. incomp.(*)  excl. incomp.(*) 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Number of individuals in 96  14,370  11,609  2,249 
Average labour market experience in 96 (yrs)  4.2  4.3  4.3 
Proportion with previous Job Subsidy in 96  5.8%  5.9%  5.9% 
Proportion with previous Training in 96  47.1%  48.9%  49.8% 
Average remaining time in UI in 96 (mths)  11.6  12.6  12.6 
Average time to ﬁrst employment (mths)  5.8  5.9  6.0 
Average number of U spells 96-Dec98  1.91  2.00  1.97 
Average number of E spells 96-Dec98  1.61  1.70  1.64 
(*) At entrance into the sample we assess whether there is incompatible information from diﬀerent data sources.  Individuals with 
incompatible information regarding past employment experience (as derived from the employer provided information) and eligibility 
to unemployment beneﬁts (as derived from the unemployment registry) are excluded from the sample. 
In what follows we use the full sample excluding incompatibilities (described in column (2) 
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using the 20% subsample but are more precise. 
Figure 1 displays the proportion of individuals in unemployment, employment and either 
active labour market programme. At the start of the data set, all individuals are unemployed. 
At the end of the sample, about 10% are unemployed.  At any point in time, about 2.2% of 
individuals are in a training programme and 0.6% are in a job subsidy programme. 
Figure 1: Labour market status over time 
Figure 2 displays the enrolment rate into training or job subsidy programmes as a function 
of the remaining eligibility to unemployment beneﬁts. Enrolment in a subsidised job does not 
appear to be related to eligibility to UI. On the contrary, enrolment in training programmes is 
increasing in the remaining eligibility and peaks a few months before the individual loses the 
right to UI. This suggests that training programmes are used to renew eligibility. 
Figures 3 and 4 compare treated with matched controls with respect to two alternative 
outcomes:  the remaining duration of unemployment from enrolment into treatment and the 
duration of the next employment spell.  In both cases, treated are individuals enrolling into 
training or subsidised employment during their ﬁrst 12 months in the sample while still in 



































0 5 10 15
remaining eligibility
data: subsidised jobs data: training
Figure 2: Participation in labour market programmes by remaining eligibility to UI

restrict the analysis to individuals observed up to the end of the observational time window, 
December 1998. Controls are individuals remaining unemployed and without treatment for at 
least the time it took the treated to enrol into treatment.  We match exactly on the period 
of sample inﬂow and time to treatment.  To compare the duration of employment spells we 
further condition on having a subsequent employment spell and the outcome is measured on 
the ﬁrst employment spell after the treatment period. 
Figure 3 shows an initial 4-month lock-in eﬀect of both types of treatment.  This is the 
minimum period the individuals remain in treatment. After that, training seems to reduce the 
speed at which individuals leave unemployment while subsidised employment seems to have 
the reverse eﬀect.  The impact is so large for individuals in subsidised employment that the 
lock-in eﬀect is totally overcome by month 6 after enrolment into treatment. 
Figure 4 suggests that both programmes are beneﬁcial with respect to the duration of future 
employment, although the eﬀect of subsidised jobs seems to be much more substantial. 
However, these results may be plagued with selection bias. Table 2 shows the characteristics 
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window by type of treatment. It is clear from these ﬁgures that the treated are not a random 
sample of this population. Individuals with previous treatment spells are always more likely to 
take further treatment and more so of the same type they have previously experienced. They 
have also accumulated less experience, particularly those that have undergone some training 
prior to inﬂow. 
We now turn to earnings in employment.  Table 3 displays the coeﬃcients of a regression 
of log wage on experience and dummies for having participated in either a subsidised job or a 
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Table  2:  Treated  versus  non-treated  within  observational  time  window  - characteristics  at 
inﬂow 
Subsidized job 
non-treated  treated 
Training 
non-treated  treated 
past experience in months 
% had subsidised jobs in the past 













Notes:  Table shows characteristics at inﬂow of individuals that take and do not take treatment during the observa­
tional time window (January 96 to December 98), by type of treatment. 
training programme during the observational window.  The analysis is conditional on having 
had no treatment prior to inﬂow.  We compute the treatment eﬀects using both OLS and a 
ﬁxed eﬀects regression. Cross section estimates (columns (1) and (2) in the table) suggest that 
subsidised jobs have a positive impact on earnings of almost 3.5%.  On the contrary, training 
seems to have a detrimental eﬀect on earnings of over 9%. However, these numbers are unlikely 
to be consistent estimates of the treatment eﬀects if selection into treatment is not random. 
The next two columns in table 3 display the ﬁrst diﬀerences estimates of a similar regression. 
By using ﬁrst diﬀerences, we remove ﬁxed diﬀerences in productivity at individual level. While 
individuals experiencing unemployment see a 2% decrease in their wage, the eﬀects of both 
labour market programmes are positive, 7.5% for subsidised jobs and 5.9% for training. There 
are at least three possible explanations for these results. The ﬁrst, of course, is that treatment 
genuinely improves the earnings of participants.  The second is that some mechanism like the 
Ashenfelter’s dip rules participation:  agents that have suﬀered a drop in earnings before be-
coming unemployed are more likely to enrol into treatment.  However, a simple comparison 
of the earnings growth rates of treated and non-treated before an unemployment spell does 
not support this hypothesis.  The third explanation is that programme participation aﬀects 
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Table 3: Determinants of log earnings

OLS  First diﬀerences 
Coeﬃcient  sd. err.  Coeﬃcient  sd. err. 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
experience (log)  0.155  0.011  -0.610  0.353 
Job subsidy  0.035  0.014  0.075  0.044 
Training  -0.093  0.007  0.059  0.021 
unemployment  0.011  0.007  -0.023  0.005 
constant  8.963  0.045  0.0089  0.005 
observations  98,843  93,748 
Notes:  Regressions are conditional on no programme participation prior to ﬁrst ob­
servation.  The observations in these regressions are the months in employment of all 
individuals included in the selected sample with no incompatibilities.  This is why 
there are many more observations used in these regressions than individuals in the 
sample.  The regression in ﬁrst diﬀerences discards the ﬁrst working observation for 
each individual with at least one employment spell over the observational window. 
selection into employment and the selection process generates these results.  Programme par­
ticipation provides treatment and  renews eligibility to UI. As a consequence, unemployment 
may become a more valued option after treatment, increasing the reservation wage and making 
individuals more selective about which jobs to accept. 
The large diﬀerences between estimates obtained using OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects show how 
important it is to take into account unobserved heterogeneity related to labour productivity. 
In the next section we develop a model that explicitly addresses the dynamic selection issues 
and allows for unobserved heterogeneity. 
16 3  The model 
3.1  An overview 
We model labour supply and programme participation for a group of workers who have become 
unemployed early on in their career.  The model incorporates the main institutional features 
of the Swedish active labour market programmes faced by this cohort in the late nineties. 
Individuals are assumed to be forward looking and to make fully informed decisions about 
their working lives. The framework we use has its origins in the seminal work by Eckstein and 
Wolpin (1989a and b). 
The model is set in discrete time with one period corresponding to a month.  Because the 
individuals are young when they enter the sample we solve their optimisation problem as if 
they were inﬁnitely lived. In each time period, the individual chooses an activity to maximise 
the  expected  present  value  of  rewards  (utility)  subject  to  constraints  (e.g.  ”is  an  oﬀer  of 
a job available?”) and to available information.  Possible (mutually exclusive) activities are 
employment, unemployment and participation in one of two programmes - subsidised job and 
training. 
Thus, while out of work, the individual may be oﬀered a job or a place on a programme. 
The individual then assesses the relative costs and beneﬁts of participation, including those 
expected in the future, and chooses the best option. Individuals receive oﬀers at diﬀerent rates, 
depending on their characteristics. These may change over time, as a result of the individual’s 
actions. 
Once in a job,  the individual receives a wage determined by her/his characteristics and 
subject to random shocks. Individuals who receive suﬃciently bad stochastic shocks may move 
into unemployment.  We do not separate between voluntary and involuntary job separations 
because the data does not seem to support such distinction.  According to previous estimates 
of our model, where a job destruction probability was introduced instead of allowing for some 
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permanent taste from employment, the job destruction probability is zero and the model is 
incapable of reproducing the transitions into employment, both from unemployment and the 
programmes.  Accordingly, we also do not account for diﬀerences between quits and layoﬀs in 
terms of eligibility to UI while in reality the former would not be eligible.  This is also in line 
with the fact that UI sanctions are rare in Sweden. We therefore abstract from this aspect of 
the unemployment policy. 
There are several sources of dynamics in the model: (i) participation in programmes aﬀects 
future beneﬁts while out of work, future earnings and the chances of receiving job and treatment 
oﬀers; and (ii) employment aﬀects experience, earnings and the beneﬁts while out of work. 
3.2  A formal description of the model 
3.2.1  The state space 
In each period the individual decides about labour market status.  We consider four possible 
alternatives, employment (E), unemployment (U), subsidised employment (J) and training 
(T ). The decision at each point in time is determined by the information set at the individual’s 
disposal. We assume the relevant information is described by a set of relevant variables, some 
observable and others unobservable by the econometrician. 
The observable state space includes work experience (e); the remaining number of months of 
entitlement to UI beneﬁts (u where u is below a cap u = 14 months); the accumulated number 
of periods working or in a programme since UI eligibility was last exhausted (m where m is 
below a cap m = 4);7 the number of spells in subsidised employment and training programmes 
(pJ  and pT , respectively), and the number of such spells completed at the start of the current 
out-of-work spell if applicable (sJ  and sT , respectively); the exogenous variables (x) including 
7Although the true policy parameter is m = 5 we choose to use m = 4. See the data section for a justiﬁcation 
of this choice. 
18 region of residence.8  The set of possible values of these observable variables constitute the 
state space Ω; at each point in time, t agent i draws a point in this state space, Ωit. 
The state space for the unobservable variables is denoted by Γ where Γit is the point drawn 
by individual i at time t.  Γ includes a number of variables:  (i)  a productivity innovation, 
ν,  which  arrives  with  probability  π  if  the  agent  is  employed  or  in  a  subsidised  job  and  is 
also realised by non-employed individuals receiving a job oﬀer; (ii) job and programme oﬀers, 
which arrive with probabilities ol  for l = E, J, T ; and (iii) the transitory taste shocks, �l  for 
l = E, J, T . 
Finally, we also allow for two sources of unobserved heterogeneity: θW , which explains per­
manent diﬀerences in productivity (wage) levels; and θE , which explains permanent diﬀerences 
in job attachment.  In what follows we call the former ability and the latter taste for employ­
ment.  We denote by θ the 2-factor unobserved heterogeneity, θ  = 
�
θW ,θE �
.  Both sources 
of heterogeneity have a discrete distribution.  Following some experimentation the former has 
three points of support and the latter two. 
3.3  The individual’s problem 
Let dit  describe the labour market status of individual i at time t with possible values l = 
U, E, J, T .  This is the decision variable.  dit = l means that alternative l has been selected in 
period t. 
The problem of individual i in period τ is to select the optimal sequence of feasible activities 












l  max  Eτ ⎣  β
t−τ 1(dit  it (Ωit, Γit,θi) Ωiτ , Γiτ ,θi⎦
{dit}t=τ,...  t=τ l∈{U,E,J,T } 
where β  is the discount rate,  Rl  represents the per period reward or utility function when 
8sJ  and sT  determine the amount of compensation while in unemployment, not pJ  and pT . 
19 labour  market  option  l  is  selected  and  Eτ  is  the  expectations  operator  conditional  on  the 
available information at time τ. 
This maximisation problem is subject to a number of restrictions,  including the laws of 
motion  for  the  state  variables  and  the  feasibility of  the  diﬀerent labour  market options  in 
each period.  We now describe the per-period reward functions and the restrictions to the 
maximisation problem. 
3.4  Per period reward functions 
Contemporaneous  utility  is  assumed  to  be  logarithmic  in  income.  Income  is  modelled  as 
a  dynamic  process.  Working  and  programme  participation  aﬀect  future  earnings  while  in 
employment, as well as income while out of work given its link to the market wage. 
The contemporaneous utility from employment  The market wage for an individual of 
ability type θW with e periods of working experience and (pJ ,pT ) treatments is w(eit,pit
J ,pT ,θW ). it i 
The actual earnings are also determined by the transitory productivity shock, ν, so that 





W ) exp(νit). 
Following the patterns in the data, we model the persistence in ν through a positive prob­
ability but smaller than 1 probability of receiving a wage innovation in each period (π).9  So, 
for an individual who has two sequential employment periods, 





wit  with probability π 
w(eit+1,pit
J 
+1,pT  ,θW ) exp(νit+1)  with probability 1 − π it+1 i 
If a wage innovation is received while in employment, it is drawn from the distribution N (0,σ1). 
While out of work, a new job oﬀer is drawn from the distribution of wage innovations, N (0,σ0). 
9We have experimented with an AR(1) process for the innovation ν. However such model could not reproduce 
important patterns in the data such as the transitions from employment. 
20 The current reward of employment for individual i at time t can now be expressed as, 
J T R











i  i it 
where the taste for employment is captured by the unobserved heterogeneity term, θE .  The 
transitory taste shock, �E , is uncorrelated over time and has distribution N (0,σ2 ). E 
The contemporaneous utility from unemployment  The period utility from unemploy­
ment depends on the eligibility status to UI. An eligible individual (u > 0) is entitled to a 
proportion α of the market wage for a worker of similar characteristics up to a ceiling, B.  10  An 
ineligible individual (u = 0) is entitled to a ﬂat social security rate, b.  The contemporaneous 
utility function for an unemployed individual i at time t is 
⎧






eit,sit,s ,θW � 
,B
�� 
if uit > 0 
R
U (Ωit, Γit,θ) = 
it i 
⎩ ln(b)  if uit = 0 
where sJ  and sT  measure the number of programmes the individual has participated in up 
to the beginning of the current out-of-work spell and UIit  is the amount of unemployment 
insurance the individual receives while entitled. 
The  contemporaneous  utility  from  subsidised  employment  We deﬁne a subsidised 
employment spell to equal the number of months required for the renewal of beneﬁt eligibility 
(m). An individual may have consecutive spells in subsidised employment. This treatment does 
not change the individual’s work experience. Instead, the productivity eﬀects are measured by 
an indicator of the number of past treatment spells, pit
J . The two other diﬀerences to regular 
employment are that subsidised employment does not accrue utility θi
E  and the taste shock is 
speciﬁc to the programme. The reward function for the whole m-months period on a subsidised 
10This is a simpliﬁcation of the actual policy, which states that the individual is entitled to a proportion α 
of the earnings in the last employment up to a ceiling, B. 
21 job is, 
R
J (Ωit, Γit,θ) =









1 − β 
it	 it 
where t is the ﬁrst treatment period.  The transitory taste shock, �J , is assumed to be uncor­
related over time and has distribution N (0,σ2 ). J 
In consecutive subsidised employment spells, the productivity innovation is allowed to ex­
hibit some persistence in a fashion similar to what is described above for consecutive employ­
ment periods. 
The  contemporaneous  utility  from  training  Finally, the contemporaneous returns to 
training programmes depend on whether the minimum working experience requirement for 
UI has been fulﬁlled in the past.  Again, we only consider long spells, lasting for at least m 
months, and the longer spells are split into subsequent spells of exactly m months.  The per­
period income is either the UI beneﬁt or the social security ﬂat rate subsidy, depending on 
whether e is larger or smaller than m. The reward function for the whole m periods is, 
⎧
1−βm 
ln(UIit) + �T  if eit ≥ m it R










ln(b) + �T  if eit < m it 
where  the  transitory  taste  component,  �T  is  uncorrelated  time  and  has  distribution  it,	 over 
N (0,σ2 ). T 
3.5  Transitions 
The feasible set of activities in any period is restricted by the present activity and the arrival 
of oﬀers for the alternative activities l = E, J, T .  We follow the patterns observed in data, 
excluding direct transitions from employment into the programmes and from subsidised jobs 
into training.  Conditional on receiving an oﬀer, the individual will then decide whether to 
accept it or to remain (or become) unemployed. We assume the time intervals to be suﬃciently 
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small to ensure that at most one oﬀer arrives in each period.  The oﬀer arrival probabilities, 
ol  for l = E, J, T , are allowed to vary with the individual’s characteristics. They are modelled 
as a logistic function of the activity in the previous period, past programme participation and 
region of residence.  Treatment oﬀers also depend on remaining eligibility time, to reﬂect the 
fact that the case oﬃcers in the job-centres will often prioritise ﬁnding a placement for those 
who are running out of beneﬁts.11 
3.6  The intertemporal value functions 
Conditional on receiving an oﬀer, the individual’s decision is based on the comparison of the 
present and future value of each option. This process is described by the comparison of value 
functions for each alternative activity.  We now describe these value functions.  We denote 
by Vit
l  the inter-temporal value of option l at time t for individual i.  It is a function of all 
contemporaneous observable and unobservable variables but we omit this dependence for ease 
of notation. 
The value of employment  depends on its contemporaneous returns, RE (Ωit, Γit,θi), and 
on future prospects as aﬀected by current employment while assuming optimal decisions in 
the future.  Employed individuals  can always remain  employed for  as  long  as  the value of 
employment remains high enough.  The outside option is to move into unemployment.  The 
value of being employed can then be written as, 
Vit
E  =  RE (Ωit, Γit,θi) + 






+1,V E  ��









+1,V E  �� �θi, Ωit,wit+1 = � wit,dit = E
�
it+1
where the two last terms represent the continuation values under the two alternatives depend­
ing on the realisation or not of a wage innovation.  An innovation occurs with probability π 
11In oﬀering treatment, priority is given to individuals close to exhausting their eligibility to UI. 
23 (3rd line in the equation). The operators E�E  and E�E ,ν stand for the expectations with respect 
to �E or (�E,ν) at time t + 1, respectively. In all that follows, Eα represents the expected value 
with respect to the random variable α at t+1. The expectations are conditional on the present 
(time t) information and use the laws of motion described below to learn about the state space 
at t + 1 which is the (omitted) argument of Vt
l 
+1 for l = U, E. The notation we use below is in 
line with the one just discussed. 
The  value  of  unemployment  While unemployed, the individual may receive an oﬀer of 
any type (employment and the two programme types).  The decision of whether or not to 
move will depend on the relative value of the two alternatives, where unemployment is always 
a possibility. Thus, the value of unemployment at period t is 
Vit
U  =  RU (Ωit, Γit,θi) + 
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V U  �
� θi, Ωit,dit = U
�
it+1 i 
where the terms in lines 2, 3 and 4 correspond to the possibility of receiving a job, subsidised 
employment or training oﬀers, respectively.  The last term deals with the possibility that no 
oﬀer  to  start  at  t + 1  arrives,  in  which  case  the  individuals  has  no  option  but  to  remain 
unemployed. 
The value of subsidised employment and training  The current utility while on a sub­
sidised job, RJ (Ωit, Γit,θi), accounts for the duration of the spell (m months).  In m months 
time the individual will be weighing up the options and if possible will be deciding whether to 
move into employment or a new subsidised employment spell.12  The value of a subsidised job 
12Direct  transitions  into  training  programmes  from  subsidised  jobs  have  been  excluded  as  they  are  not 
observed in the data. 
24 is 
V J  =  RJ (Ωit, Γit,θi) + it
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The value of the training option is similarly given by 
Vit
T  =  RT (Ωit, Γit,θi) + 
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3.7  Dynamics of the information set 
The  rules  governing  the  dynamics  of  the  observable  state  variables  depend  on  the  present 
activity. Conditional on activity, they follow simple, deterministic rules. 
Working experience is accumulated on the job only, each month in employment representing 
an additional period. 
Eligibility to UI  is determined by the variable u, which measures the remaining months of 
UI entitlement.  u is limited by a maximum number of entitlement periods, u, and is “used 
up” while the individual is unemployed: for each period in unemployment, the individual loses 
entitlement  to  one  period  of  UI  beneﬁts.  The  associated  variable  m  deﬁnes  the  eligibility 
25 requirement.  To ﬁrst gain eligibility to the full u months of insured unemployment the indi­
vidual must complete m months in regular employment. After that, full eligibility is regained 
by either completing a further m periods on a job or by participating in programmes for the 
same length of time. Since we are only considering long programme spells, lasting at least for 
m months, programme enrolment will always lead to full eligibility after the initial working 
requirement is fulﬁlled. Both m and u are zero at the start of working life. At the start of our 
observational time window, however, they will generally be diﬀerent from zero as individuals 
have had time to accumulate some working and treatment experience. 
Programme experience is accumulated through programme participation. We consider pro­
gramme spells lasting for exactly m and split longer spells in sequences of treatments. We only 
consider the impact of the ﬁrst treatment spell of each type. 
3.8  Estimation method 
The full structural model is estimated by maximum likelihood using a nested optimisation 
algorithm where the inner routine solves the structural problem of the worker conditional on 
the model parameters and the outer routine maximises the likelihood function (see Rust, 1994, 
for a description of these sort of algorithms). To ensure stationarity, experience is assumed to 
have no impact on earnings after 20 years of work. 
Unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to follow a discrete distribution.  We allowed for 6 
diﬀerent unobserved types, resulting from a combination of 3 ability types and 2 preference 
types.  Unobserved heterogeneity aﬀects decisions through a number of dimensions, including 
earnings,  returns to experience and returns to treatment,  employment and treatment oﬀer 
probabilities and job attachment.  We estimate the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity 
using non-parametric maximum likelihood following (see Heckman and Singer, 1984). 
The sample selection process, which chooses 25-30 years old males ﬂowing into unemploy­
ment during 1996, creates an initial conditions problem: working experience and accumulated 
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programme participation at entrance are endogenous in the sense that they are correlated with 
unobserved heterogeneity.  While we do not deal with it here, we plan to do so in the future. 
The full likelihood function can be found in appendix B. 
As described in the data section above, estimation was based on a random sub-sample of 
20% of the individuals in the administrative data that start an unemployment spell during 
1996. 
4  Estimation results 
4.1  Estimated parameters 
The model is fully described by a total of 40 parameters and all the estimates are presented in 
appendix A. Here we provide a brief description of some of the more meaningful parameters. 
Table 4: Unobserved heterogeneity: joint distribution of the two factors 
Heterogeneity in preferences 
Low taste for E  High taste for E 
Ability 
low  5.14%  3.02% 
medium  17.80%  58.25% 
high  15.72%  0.06% 
Table 4 shows the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity over the population. Over 75% 
of our sample is concentrated in the “medium-ability” group, with most of them having “high 
taste from employment”. In contrast, we ﬁnd few people in the tails with “lower” or “higher” 
ability. 
27 Table 5: Estimates of the wage equation

Coeﬃcient  % Eﬀect on Earnings 
ln(experience)  0.039  0.30% (*) 
Past subsidised jobs: 1  0.001  0.12% 
Past training programmes  0.000  0.00% 
constant: low productivity  8.749 
constant: medium productivity  9.909 
constant: high productivity  9.558 
(*)  Impact  of  4  extra  months  of  work  on  the  wage  of  an  individual  with  52  months  of 
experience.  This is the sample average experience for ﬁrst-time participants into subsidised 
employment  at  the  time  of  enrolment.  For  training  spells,  the  average  past  experience  is 
slightly higher, at about 65 months. 
The estimated parameters on the (log) earnings equation are presented in Table 5.  In the 
last column of this table we compare the impact of treatment with that of 4 additional months 
of working experience on the wage of an individual with 52 months of working experience (this 
is the average past experience at inﬂow into subsidised employment for ﬁrst time participants). 
Subsidised jobs increase earnings very modestly. At about 0.12%, the impact of subsidised jobs 
on earnings amounts to less than half the impact of spending the same time in regular jobs 
at the same level of experience (0.3%). This suggests that the nature of these jobs is diﬀerent 
from regular employment, possibly contributing less to human capital formation. Training has 
virtually no eﬀect on earnings. 
In contrast with the results in column (1) of table 3, estimates of the wage equation within 
the model accounting for the full selection process show much smaller eﬀects of working experi­
ence and both types of treatment on earnings. This seems to support the view that enrolment 
into treatment and employment is related to unobserved characteristics such as ability. Treat­
ment eﬀects on earnings under the structural selection speciﬁcation are also smaller than the 
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ﬁxed eﬀects estimates in column (3) of table 3. This evidence suggests that the treatment af­
fects the selection mechanism into work: under the Swedish system, programme participation 
renews eligibility to UI, raising the reservation wage for the treated and consequently delaying 
entrance into employment. 
Table 6:  Estimates of oﬀer probabilities by previous activity, treatment status and region of 
residence 
Activity in period t − 1 
Unemployment 
not treated  treated: sub. job  treated: training  Sub. empl.  Training 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Job oﬀer probabilities 
(1)  Residence: city  17.5%  15.9%  18.5%  35.2%  18.8% 
(2)  Residence: rural  20.4%  18.7%  21.5%  39.6%  21.9% 
(3)  Residence: other  18.2%  16.6%  19.2%  36.3%  19.6% 
Subsidised employment oﬀer probabilities 
(4)  Residence: city  0.8%  0.3%  1.3%  15.9%  3.6% 
(5)  Residence: rural  1.1%  0.5%  2.0%  20.1%  5.2% 
(6)  Residence: other  0.8%  0.3%  1.3%  15.8%  3.6% 
Training oﬀer probabilities 
(7)  Residence: city  4.8%  4.9%  11.5%  - 77.6% 
(8)  Residence: rural  6.1%  6.3%  14.2%  - 73.0% 
(9)  Residence: other  5.0%  5.1%  11.9%  - 76.8% 
These are estimates of the functions ol  for l = U, J, T  being the previous activity.  Apart from previous activity, these functions 
also depend on treatment status and region of residence.  The table presents the probabilities of being oﬀered a job or a treatment 
placement for the diﬀerent combinations of these variables. 
Table 6 presents estimates of job and treatment oﬀer probabilities under alternative cir­
29 cumstances depending on previous activity, whether or not the individual has been treated in 
the past and region of residence.  Activity in period t − 1 strongly aﬀects oﬀer probabilities. 
Being in a subsidised job spell more than doubles the probability of being oﬀered a job in the 
next period (column (4) as compared with the remaining columns, rows(1)-(3)). This probably 
reﬂects a transformation of the subsidised job into regular employment where the individual 
remains in the same ﬁrm, possibly doing a similar task but now in the regular workforce. How­
ever, having had subidised jobs in the past does not seem to help job search. On the contrary, 
it has a small negative impact on job oﬀer probabilities, suggesting it might give a bad signal 
to potential employers (column (2) versus columns (1) and (3), rows (1)-(3)).  Training does 
not seem to aﬀect oﬀer probabilities other than those of training:  past training spells make 
training oﬀers more likely to arrive (column (3), rows (7)-(9)) while having been in training 
at t − 1 makes it very probable to be able to continue (column (5), rows (7)-(9)).  These es­
timates together with the also high oﬀer probabilities of subisdised employment for agents in 
subsidised employment are partly determined by the continuation of the same treatment spell 
over 4 months. 
4.2  Fit of the model 
In this section we show some evidence on the ﬁt of the model along with a discussion of the 
directly observable patterns of the data.  In assessing the ﬁt we use the distribution of initial 
conditions  in  our  sample  and  simulate  the  individual  decisions  throughout  the  observable 
period.  Each individual is simulated 30 times.  We then compare the patterns created by the 
simulated data with what is observed in the real data. 
Table 7 displays the data and simulated month-to-month transition probabilities between 
alternative labour market states. Rows (5) and (10) show the proportion of observations falling 
in each state and, as expected, the simulations reproduce observable data very closely.  This 
is conﬁrmed in ﬁgure 5, which presents the proportion of individuals in each state over time 
30
Table 7: Fit of Model - transitions between labour market states

U  E  S  T 
Real Data: 
(1)  unemployment (U)  0.781  0.177  0.005  0.038 
(2)  employment (E)  0.064  0.936  0.000  0.000 
(3)  subsidised job (S)  0.133  0.084  0.783  0.000 
(4)  training (T)  0.142  0.039  0.003  0.826 
(5)  total  0.320  0.610  0.007  0.063 
Simulated Data: 
(6)  unemployment (U)  0.785  0.174  0.005  0.036 
(7)  employment (E)  0.066  0.934  0.000  0.000 
(8)  subsidised job (S)  0.133  0.080  0.787  0.000 
(9)  training (T)  0.139  0.041  0.003  0.817 
(10)  total  0.325  0.607  0.008  0.060 
from the moment of sample inﬂow.  The dashed and full lines stand for simulated and real 
data,  respectively.  The simulated  data  seem  to  reproduce the  average  evolution  of  labour 
market status quite closely but fails to capture the seasonal patterns (the current version of 
the  estimates  does  not  allow  for  seasonal  variation  but  this  will  be  incorporated  in  future 
versions of the model). 
Another particularly important feature is the pattern of transitions between diﬀerent states. 
The remaining rows in table 7 present the data (rows (1) to (4)) and model (rows (6) to (9)) 
transition probabilities. Again, the simulated pattern is very closed to the observed one. 
Figures 6 and 7 compare data and model regarding the probabilities of inﬂow into treatment 
and employment by remaining months of eligibility to unemployment beneﬁt. While we are able 
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Figure 5: Fit of the model - labour market status over time

Figure 6: Fit of the model - Transitions into treatment by remaining eligibility time 
for the inﬂows into employment.  Instead of the generally upward sloping curve displayed by 
the data,  which suggests compositional changes in the pool of unemployment by eligibility 
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Figure 7: Fit of the model - Transitions into employment by remaining eligibility time

Figure 8: Fit of the model - Hazard rates from employment and unemployment 
unemployed as eligibility approaches exhaustion.  This means that heterogeneity related with 
the  taste  for  employment  is  not  enough  to  counteract  the  change  in  the  relative  value  of 
unemployment due to exhaustion of the beneﬁt.  This pattern of the simulated data suggests 
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that an additional source of heterogeneity might be needed and requires careful attention in 
future work. 
Instead, heterogeneity related to the taste for employment is much more eﬀective in captur­
ing duration dependence on the job. Figure 8 shows that the evolution of the hazard rates from 
both employment and unemployment is captured quite well by the model. Figure 8 also shows 
a peak in the outﬂows from unemployment around a duration of 14 months, which is captured 
by the model as a response to beneﬁt exhaustion.  According to ﬁgures 6 and 7, such peak 
arises from the transitions into training near or at beneﬁt exhaustion, not from transitions into 
employment. 
Table 8: Fit of the Model - Distribution of the logarithm of observed earnings 
Data  Model

Mean  9.68  9.69 
St. deviation  0.42  0.52 
Percentile: 
1  8.00  8.35 
5  8.92  8.81 
25  9.57  9.36 
50  9.72  9.71 
75  9.89  10.04 
95  10.24  10.53 
99  10.62  10.89 
Tables 8 and 9 show how close the model reproduces the data on earnings.  Table 8 shows 
that the distribution of earnings among workers is very close in the two datasets.  Table 9 
then assesses the correlation between earnings among the employed and diﬀerent individual 
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Table 9: Fit of the Model - (Log) Wage equations

Data  Model 
Coeﬃcient  Std. Error  Coeﬃcient  Std. Error 
log(experience) 



















characteristics. The results are very similar in the actual and simulated data although the size 
of the correlation between training programmes and earnings is signiﬁcantly larger in the data 
than in the model.13 
4.3  Eﬀects of treatment 
Using our model estimates, we can now simulate the impact of programme participation on in­
dividual outcomes. As before, all simulations use the distribution of initial conditions observed 
in the data. Given the solution to the dynamic problem and conditional on a random draw of 
the unobservables in the model we can then simulate the optimal labour market decisions of 
these individuals.  We simulate the labour market history of each individual 50 times and use 
these simulations to compute both the average treatment eﬀect (ATE) and the average eﬀect 
of treatment on the treated (ATT). 
The ATE is obtained from the comparison between: (i) the simulated labour market histo­
13Table 9 uses all data and simulated observations to compute the correlation between earnings and some of 
the observables aﬀecting earnings. It is diﬀerent from table 3, where observations were selected and two of the 
most widely used methods were used to support the discussion about the identiﬁcation of the causal impact of 
treatment. 
35 ries of individuals ﬂowing into unemployment during 1996 and (ii) their simulated histories had 
they been forced into treatment at inﬂow into unemployment in 1996.  We do this separately 
for both subsidised employment and training. 
The ATT is obtained from the comparison between: (i) the simulated labour market histo­
ries of individuals ﬂowing into unemployment during 1996 and joining a programme at some 
point during the ﬁrst 2 simulated years and (ii) the simulated labour market history of the 
same subgroup of individuals had they been refused participation on that ﬁrst treatment they 
intended to take.  That is, the ATT measures the impact on individuals that are observed in 
the simulations to select into treatment.14 
For both the ATE and the ATT, we then simulate individual choices over the next 3 years in 
both treatment scenarios (being and not being treated) and compute the eﬀects by comparing 
treated and controls. The eﬀects arise as a combination of impacts of treatment on productivity 
levels, job oﬀer probabilities and a change in the returns to unemployment due to the way 
treatment aﬀects eligibility to unemployment beneﬁts. 
There are two substantial diﬀerences between the ATE and the ATT. First, of course, is 
the nature of the parameter:  ATE is the average impact on a randomly selected individual 
while ATT is the impact on individuals that self-select into treatment.  And second, diﬀerent 
deﬁnitions of treatment are used in each case:  the ATE measures the impact of treatment at 
inﬂow into unemployment while ATT measures the impact of treatment at a moment in the 
ﬁrst unemployment spell selected by the individual. 
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 10 display the ATE on income and activity over the 3 years 
that follow completion of treatment.  Both programmes have a negative eﬀect on earnings. 
This is especially true for training, which reduces earnings by 1.1%. Training also substantially 
decreases time in employment (by about 5%). Two factors explain this eﬀect: training induces 
14This treated group is similar to the one used to plot the impact of treatment on the duration of unemploy­
ment and subsequent employment spells as displayed in ﬁgures 3 and 4. 
36 Table 10: Impact of treatment on income and activity over the 3 years after treatment

Average Treatment Eﬀect  Average Treatment on the Treated 
Subsidised job  Training  Subsidised job  Training 
(1)  Income  -0.8%  -1.1%  +1.3%  +0.4% 
(2)  Time in employment  -0.2%  -4.8%  +0.2%  -2.7% 
(3)  Time in subsidised jobs  +0.7%  +0.2%  +0.5%  +0.1% 
(4)  Time in training  -0.6%  +2.2%  -0.5%  +1.2% 
individuals  to  participate  in  further  treatment  and  raises  time  in  unemployment.  On  the 
other hand, subsidised employment reduces future time in training but increases future time 
in subsidised employment, most likely with the same employer as these spells frequently last 
for longer than our standard length of treatment of 4 months. 
These eﬀects are less positive than the comparable ATT eﬀects presented in the last two 
columns in table 10. This shows that the treated are not a random sample of the population. 
Instead, selection on future gains seems to play a role on the participation decision and the 
returns from treatment are not homogeneous.  This seems to be true for both programmes. 
We now investigate the extent of the selection mechanism. 
4.4	 Average  eﬀects  of  treatment  on  the  treated:  unobserved  het­
erogeneity 
Table 11 presents the proportion of individuals in each programme by unobserved heterogeneity 
types.  Participation in subsidised employment seems to be independent of type and driven 
mainly by the availability of places. On the contrary, enrolment into training is more frequent 
among  individuals  who  have  a  relatively  low  taste  for  employment  but  is  not  aﬀected  by 
productivity levels. 
37 Table  11:  Selection  into  treatment  by  unobserved  heterogeneity  - proportion  of  treated  in 
group 
Low taste for E  High taste for E 
Ability  Ability 
All  low  medium  high  low  medium  high 
% in Subsidised job  2.2%  2.0%  1.9%  2.2%  2.6%  2.2%  0.0%

% in Training  15.7%  21.8%  22.5%  22.3%  10.7%  11.6%  10.5%

Table 12 displays the ATT by types of unobserved heterogeneity.  All types of individuals 
beneﬁt from treatment in terms of income but these eﬀects arise through diﬀerent channels 
depending on the individual’s characteristics and type of treatment. 
Subsidised employment leads individuals with a lower taste for employment to reduce future 
employment participation and gains arise essentially from the prolonged eligibility to unem­
ployment insurance and improved chances of further subsidised employment spells. Individuals 
with a higher taste for employment increase future time in regular and subsidised employment 
by over 1% of their time during the following three years (or about 11 days), independently 
of productivity level, and this is the main source of additional income.  In both cases, future 
take up of training is reduced as this is mostly a substitute for subsidised employment in the 
attempt to prolong eligibility to unemployment beneﬁts. 
By contrast,  training has a smaller but still positive impact on future income,  of about 
0.4% (row (2)). If we break up this impact by remaining eligibility time, the impact is larger, 
at about 1.6%, for individuals within six months of beneﬁt exhaustion but is negative, about 
-0.5%,  for  individuals  farther  away  from  exhaustion.15  Individuals  with  a  higher  taste  for 
employment are less likely to participate in training programmes and they also beneﬁt less in 
15These results are not in the table and can be obtained from the authors under request. 
38 Table  12:  Heterogeneity  in  the  impact  of  treatment  on  the  treated  over  the  3  years  after 
treatment 
Low taste for E  High taste for E 
Ability  Ability 
All  low  medium  high  low  medium  high 
Impact on income 
(1)  job subsidy  +1.3%  +3.7%  +0.6%  +0.7%  +0.2%  +1.7%  -
(2)  training  +0.4%  +1.1%  +0.7%  +0.3%  -0.1%  +0.2%  +3.3% 
Impact on time in employment after treatment 
(3)  job subsidy  +0.2%  -0.4%  -0.3%  -0.3%  +0.5%  +0.5%  -
(4)  training  -2.7%  -1.7%  -2.2%  -2.1%  -3.4%  -3.5%  -8.3% 
Impact on time in subsidised employment after treatment 
(5)  job subsidy  +0.5%  +1.2%  +0.4%  +0.3%  +0.7%  +0.6%  -
(6)  training  +0.1%  +0.1%  +0.1%  +0.1%  +0.2%  +0.2%  0.0% 
Impact on time in training after treatment 
(7)  job subsidy  -0.5%  -0.9%  +0.4%  -0.6%  -0.2%  -0.7%  -
(8)  training  +1.2%  +1.4%  +1.6%  +1.4%  +1.2%  +0.8%  +6.7% 
terms of future income (notice that the group “high taste for employment / high ability” is 
extremely small and so the values for this category are very sensitive to strange outliers). The 
four months of training are more costly for them as they are more likely to miss acceptable job 
opportunities than individuals with a lower taste for employment. Participation in training has 
also a strong eﬀect on further treatment take up, particularly training, suggesting the scheme 
induces individuals to cycle between unemployment and treatment. 
To  better  understand  the  impact  of  treatment  on  time  allocation  we  plot  its  evolution 
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Figure 9: Re-employment probabilities over time after treatment

There are very strong negative eﬀects of both types of treatment immediately after enrolment, 
the lock-in eﬀect.  But as treatment ﬁnishes, individuals in subsidised employment ﬂow into 
regular employment very fast and become slightly more likely to be employed after 1 year from 
enrolment than if they had not been treated.  The recovery from the lock-in eﬀect is much 
slower for individuals in training and they are always less likely to be employed in the future 
than if they had not participated in the training programme.  As training raises the value of 
unemployment but does not change the value of employment, it will lead individuals to remain 
out of work for longer. 
Figures 10 to 12 show how the duration of unemployment and employment spells are af­
fected by treatment.  Figure 10 plots the remaining duration of the ﬁrst unemployment spell 
after enrolment into treatment.  The graph displays the behaviour of treated and comparable 
controls.  It shows that both types of treatment have a positive impact on the duration of 
unemployment. In the case of subsidised jobs, the increased speed at which treated move into 
jobs is not enough to compensate for the lock-in eﬀect of treatment.  Training, however, if 
anything has a zero eﬀect on the speed at which unemployed ﬁnd jobs, thus further prolonging 
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Figure  10:  Duration  of  unemployment  from  time  of  enrolment  into  treatment  by  type  of 
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Figure 11: Duration of ﬁrst employment spell after treatment by type of treatment: comparison 



































0 6 12 18 24
time from start of spell in months
treated: subsidised job controls: subsidised job
treated: training controls: training
Duration of employment











0 6 12 18 24 0 6 12 18 24
subs job, low taste for E subs job, high taste for E
























time from start of spell in months
Graphs by treatment and tasteE
Figure 12:  Duration of ﬁrst employment spell after treatment by type of treatment and taste 
for employment: comparison between treated and controls 
spell 2.1 months longer than if they had not been treated.  The similar ﬁgure for training is 
3.4 months. 
Figures 11 and 12 compare the duration of the ﬁrst employment spell after treatment for 
individuals  who  ﬁnd  jobs  in  both  scenarios,  depending  on  whether  or  not  they  have  been 
treated. Compared to participants in training programmes, the ﬁgures show that participants 
in subsidised employment have longer employment spells and enjoy a positive impact of treat­
ment on the duration of the subsequent employment spells, explaining the positive eﬀect on 
time in employment identiﬁed in table 10.  However, the eﬀect of subsidised employment on 
the duration of future employment spells is not homogeneous. Figure 12 shows that it is very 
positive among individuals with the highest taste for employment, who are over 6% more likely 
to remain employed after 1 year of ﬁnding a job, but is nil for other individuals, who beneﬁt 
from participation mainly through its eﬀect on eligibility time and additional chances of par­
ticipation in subsidised employment.  In turn, training seems to have a small negative eﬀect 
on the duration of employment spells among the agents that most beneﬁt from subsidised 
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employment. Driving this eﬀect are the zero returns to productivity of training and the higher 
value of unemployment due to renewed eligibility to unemployment insurance. 
4.5	 Average eﬀects of treatment on the treated:  observed charac­
teristics 
The results above show that the impact of treatment is heterogeneous and selection on unob­
served gains is important (although not so much for subsidised employment, perhaps because 
it is in such low oﬀer).  However, these are not very useful for the policy maker, who cannot 
observe unobservable types, and therefore cannot use this information to target interventions 
more eﬀectively.  We now discuss how selection and treatment eﬀects vary with observable 
characteristics. 
Table  13:  Selection  into  treatment  by  observable  characteristics  - proportion  of  treated  in 
group 
% in subsidised employment  % in training 
By experience at inﬂow 
(1)  lowest quartile  2.7%  18.7% 
(2)  2nd quartile  2.4%  16.3% 
(3)  3rd quartile  1.9%  14.6% 
(4)  highest quartile  1.6%  13.1% 
By duration of unemployment up to enrolment 
(5)  less than 5 months  1.4%  9.8% 
(6)  6 to 12 months  11.7%  88.3% 
(7)  over 12 months  8.6%  91.1% 
Total  2.2%  15.7% 
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Table 13 shows how treatment take-up changes with work experience and duration of un­
employment. Individuals with higher levels of experience and shorter unemployment durations 
are less likely to participate.  This is particularly the case among individuals who participate 
in training. Rows (6) and (7) show the extent to which training is used to renew eligibility to 
unemployment beneﬁts. 
Table 14:  Impact of treatment on the treated over the 3 years after treatment - by working 
experience at enrolment 
Outcome variable

Income  time in E  time in J  time in T 
Impact of subsidised employment 
(1)  low experience  +1.5%  +0.1%  +0.7%  -1.0% 
(2)  high experience  +4.0%  +0.3%  +0.6%  -0.3% 
Impact of training 
(3)  low experience  +0.7%  -2.3%  +0.1%  +0.8% 
(4)  high experience  -0.1%  -3.7%  +0.2%  +2.3% 
Notes:  Experience is measured at inﬂow in data.  “Low experience” corresponds to the ﬁrst 
quartile in the distribution of experience.  “High experience” corresponds to the 4th quartile 
in the distribution of experience. 
Tables 14 and 15 display the impact of treatment by past experience and duration of the un­
employment spell. The ﬁrst two rows in table 14 show that, although less likely to participate, 
individuals with high experience that end up in subsidised employment beneﬁt both in terms 
of income and employment.  Experience is positively related with the taste for employment 
and productivity, and these positive impacts are partly a consequence of such compositional 
diﬀerences.  On the contrary, the impact of training is more negative among high-experience 
individuals, who have higher foregone earnings and higher odds of missing acceptable job oﬀers 
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Table 15:  Impact of treatment on the treated over the 3 years after treatment - by duration 
of unemployment until enrolment 
Outcome variable

Income  time in E  time in J  time in T 
Impact of subsidised employment 
(1)  duration of U: below 6 months  +0.9%  +0.3%  +0.7%  -0.3% 
(2)  duration of U: above 12 months  +3.5%  -0.1%  +0.8%  -0.6% 
Impact of training 
(3)  duration of U: below 6 months  -0.1%  -2.7%  +0.1%  +1.1% 
(4)  duration of U: above 12 months  +2.3%  -3.3%  +0.2%  +1.4% 
while in training. 
Table 15 shows how treatment eﬀects vary with the duration of unemployment until en­
rolment.  The time of participation is a consequence of individual choices, being determined 
by other individual characteristics that will aﬀect treatment outcomes. For both training and 
subsidised employment, income gains are very pronounced for individuals who decide to par­
ticipate only after 1 year of unemployment.  This is a consequence of the institutional rules, 
which allow individuals to re-gain access to unemployment compensation through participa­
tion.  However, these individuals lose in terms of time in employment, partly at the expense 
of further treatment, a reﬂection of the compositional changes in the unemployment pool in 
terms of taste for employment as unemployment duration increases. 
5  The impact of alternative policies 
In this ﬁnal section we experiment with two alternative policy scenarios and compare them 
to the one in operation at the time represented in the data and the alternative of having no 
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available treatments while unemployed. 
The ﬁrst policy alternative (policy 1 ) removes the link between UI eligibility and programme 
participation.  In this case, only regular employment can allow one to regain access to fully 
subsidised unemployment. This policy scenario reproduces the design introduced in February 
2001. 
The second policy alternative (policy 2 ) sanctions the refusal to participate in an oﬀered 
treatment by cutting eligibility to unemployment compensation until the individual regains 
eligibility through treatment or employment.  While refusal to take up adequate treatment or 
employment is sanctioned in Sweden, this seems to happen only on the paper, being seldom 
used in practiced. In this policy scenario we enquire what would happen if treatment were to 
become compulsory as has been implemented in other countries such as the UK with the New 
Deal for Young People. 
We denote by baseline the scenario where no treatment is available and by current policy the 
scenario used in estimation characterised by both treatments being available, the possibility 
to renew eligibility through treatment and the absence of sanctions. 
In all this analysis we are abstracting from potential indirect eﬀects.  This is a reasonable 
assumption if the policy aﬀects a small proportion of individuals but is not as credible if we are 
discussing large policy reforms. In particular, the transition from our baseline scenario to one 
of the alternative policies could arguably involve important changes in the functioning of the 
labour market that would change the parameters we take as structural. However, to study the 
labour market responses to the change in policy scenarios is outside the scope of this paper. 
Instead, our impacts can be understood at an individual level as if others would continue to 
face the policy scenario used in estimation. 
To construct the simulated data we use the initial distribution of observable characteristics 
from the real data and simulate the labour market behaviour of these individuals for three years 
from inﬂow.  In all cases we compute the additional cost per capita of providing treatment as 
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compared to a baseline where only unemployment beneﬁts are available. Our estimates of the 
costs of unemployment include the income paid to individuals while out of work and the cost 
of programmes as reported in Carling and Richardson (2004).  We then simulate the eﬀect 
of the diﬀerent scenarios on labour market outcomes under the assumption that the required 
additional funding to support the alternative policies comes from sources other than the tax 
payments of the target group. 
Table 16: Eﬀects of alternative policies on outcomes over the ﬁrst 3 years after inﬂow 
Eﬀects of alternative policies 
Current  Policy 1:  Policy 2: 
Baseline  policy  no renew  sanction 
(1)  Time in unemployment  33.5%  -1.05%  -1.82%  -4.63% 
(2)  Time in employment  66.5%  -5.33%  -3.69%  -2.44% 
(3)  Utility  110.4(**)  +1.33%  +0.89%  -2.62% 
(4)  Income  579.9(*)  -0.53%  -0.88%  -5.18% 
(5)  Income from employment  447.4(*)  -8.32%  -5.77%  -4.05% 
(6)  Gov’t expenditure  132.5(*)  +31.45%  +20.32%  -2.91% 
(*) Values are in 1000s SEK and per capita over the 3 years.

(**) Accumulated utility over the 3 years.

Table  16  shows  how  the  three  alternative  policies  compare  with  the  scenario  where  no 
treatment is available.  All policies imply less unemployment and  less employment, with the 
diﬀerence being taken up by programmes.  However, it is quite clear that in this respect the 
policy that reduces employment most is the current policy.  The removal of the link between 
eligibility and the sanctions increase employment relative to the current policy. 
Both the current policy and policy 1 have positive eﬀects on the well-being of these individ­
uals (row (3)) despite the reduction in income (row (4)).  The reduction in earnings (row (5)) 
is compensated by an increase in subsidies. The reason for the increase in welfare may be due 
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to the reduction in income volatility - our individuals are risk averse with a log utility. 
Row (6) displays the change in government costs to support the change in policy.  These 
include direct costs of unemployment beneﬁts and the provision of treatment but not changes 
in revenue due to changes in employment choices and, therefore, in income tax revenue.  The 
second and third columns in row (6) show that making treatment available is very expensive, 
increasing expenditure on unemployment compensation and the provision of treatment by up 
to 30% (the impact would be even more negative if we account for losses in revenue due to 
decreased taxable income).  However, excluding the possibility of renewing eligibility through 
programme participation allows for important savings as compared with the current policy, 
and does so without substantially aﬀecting wellbeing or income. 
The introduction of sanctions reduces utility and income much more dramatically because it 
induces very short subsidised unemployment spells.  Employment income is higher relative to 
the other two policy alternatives.  As a consequence of the substantial reductions in transfers 
to the unemployed, the introduction of sanctions could actually lead to government savings as 
compared to the baseline scenario.  This, however, is at the expense of large losses in welfare 
and income for this group. 
Figure 13 shows that the reduction in employment probabilities due to the availability of 
treatment is persistent over time, particularly for the current policy and policy 1. Out-of-work 
probabilities under policy 2 seem to catch up with those of the baseline as unemployment 
becomes much less attractive under this policy.  The strong penalty that sanctions impose on 
unemployment is conﬁrmed in ﬁgure 14, which shows that policy 2 is the only one to positively 

















































































Duration of first employment spell by policy
Figure 13: Out of employment probabilities over time

Figure 14: Duration of employment spells 
6  Conclusion 
In this paper we have built a model of programme participation and labour market transitions 
so as to capture the essential elements of the Swedish programmes, as they operated in the 
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mid to late 90s.  Our model also accounts for UI eligibility and how this relates both to work 
and programme spells. Contrary to earlier evaluations, our model captures the important dy­
namic interactions and considers both short term and longer term outcomes including earnings. 
Questions we consider include the eﬀectiveness of job training programmes and subsidised job 
placements in reducing unemployment, improving job attachment and increasing earnings. To 
achieve this we model transitions between unemployment, programmes and work, jointly with 
earnings, for a cohort of individuals who became unemployed in 1996.  The model is of the 
dynamic, discrete choice, forward-looking type and is estimated for the population of unskilled 
males aged 26 to 30 who have a period of unemployment starting during 1996.  We use rich 
administrative data which have been put together for this purpose. 
Our results are sobering.  The current policy reduces employment quite substantially by 
increasing programme participation (including subsidised jobs).  There is practically no eﬀect 
on earnings - training leaves them unchanged, while a spell in subsidised employment has a 
third of the eﬀect on earnings than does a normal job. However the current policy, despite the 
decline in income, does seem to increase welfare; the reason for this is likely to be the reduction 
in income volatility. 
A substantial improvement over the current policy is obtained if programmes cannot be used 
to renew eligibility for unemployment insurance: while the positive welfare gains are maintained 
there is a substantial increase in employment, relative to the current policy. Further increases 
in employment, but this time at the expense of a decline in overall welfare for this group, can 
be achieved by imposing sanctions on those who refuse to participate in a programme. 
The results  seem  to show that  the  programme  component of  the  Swedish active labour 
market  system  is  at  best  a  costly  and  ineﬀective approach.  The  insurance  element  of  the 
system seems important for welfare purposes. The large costs of the programmes would seem 
to be better spent on other interventions. One element of the programmes that could perhaps 
be thought useful are subsidised placements.  So if anything, the training component should 
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be reduced and the subsidy programmes expanded. 
Appendix A: Estimates 
Tables 17 and 18 present the full set of estimated parameter of the model together with the 
respective standard errors. 
Appendix B: Likelihood function 
The contribution to the likelihood of each type of transition conditional on unobserved het­
erogeneity is described below. In the end, we set up the overall likelihood function. 
Let V �E  be the present value of the employment option for individual i at time t excluding it 
the contemporary transitory taste shock. Thus, V �E = V E − �E  Similarly deﬁne V �J  = V J 




T  = Vit
T  − �it
T .  For ease of notation, we omit the arguments from the value functions in 
what follows, namely (Ωit, Γit,θi) as deﬁned in the main text.  However, for clarity we include 
the productivity shock when relevant. Finally, let Lit(l, l�) be the contribution to the likelihood 
a transition from activity l to activity l�  observed between period t − 1 and t for individual i. 
It may or may not include a model of earnings depending on the type of transitions.  This is 
made explicit in what follows. 
Transitions from employment into employment 
•	 No wage innovation occurs with probability 1 − π, in which case the wage in period t 
is the same as in period t − 1 and the productivity shock, νit, is such that wit  = wit−1. 
Let V �E  be evaluated at such point and denote it by V �
it
E (νit  : wit  = wit−1).  Then the 
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contribution to the likelihood function of such transitions and wage draw is 
Lit(E, E) =  g(d,w) (dit = E, wit|dit−1 = E, νit−1, Ωit,θi) 
=  (1 − π) 
� �
Vit
U − V �
it
E (νit : wit = wit−1)
�� 
1 − Φ 
σE 
where g(d,w) is the conditional joint density of present labour market activity and earnings 
given the particular state space realisation. 
•  A wage innovation occurs then the new productivity shock ν is drawn from the distribu­
tion N (0,σ1).  Let V �E  be evaluated at the drawn innovation and denote it by V �E(νit). it 
Then the contribution to the likelihood function of such transition and wage draw is 
Lit(E, E) =  g(d,w) (dit = E, wit|dit−1 = E, Ωit,θi) 
=  π 
� 




















Transitions from employment into unemployment  The contribution to the likelihood 
in this case weights the two possibilities: having or not experienced a wage innovation. Using 
the same notation as above we have 
Lit(E, U) =  gd (dit = U|dit−1 = E, νit−1, Ωit,θi) 
=  (1 − π)Φ 
�
Vit
U − V �
it



















σE  σ1  σ1 −∞ 
where gd is the conditional probability of the present labour market activity given the particular 
state space realisation. 
Transitions from subsidised employment into employment  We assume there is always 
an innovation in this case, which is consistent with the data.  We use the same notation as 
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above. We also omit the arguments from the oﬀer probabilities for simplicity of notation except 
for the previous labour market status, 
Lit(J, E) =  g(d,w) (dit = E, wit|dit−1 = J, Ωit,θi) 
=  o 
E (dit−1 = J) 
� �
Vit









it  1 − Φ 
σE  σ1  σ1 
Transitions from subsidised employment into subsidised employment  Again, there 
are two possibilities depending on whether there is an innovation.  However, there is never an 
innovation in the data so we consider the case of no innovation only. We use a similar notation 
to the explained above. 
Lit(J, J) =  g(d,w) (dit = J, wit dit−1 = J, νit−1, Ωit,θi) 
V J 
=  o 
J








it (νit : wit = wit−1)
�� 
σJ 
Transitions from subsidised employment into unemployment  In this case we consider 
the possibility of having or not received a wage innovation if another instance of subsidised 
employment is oﬀered (and rejected), 
Lit(J, U) =  gd (dit = U dit−1 = J, νit−1, Ωit,θi) 
E 
|









=  oit (dit−1 = J) Φ 
− �
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J (dit−1 = J) (1 − π)Φ 
�
Vit
U − V �
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dν + it (dit−1  σJ  σ1  σ1 −∞ 
E J �
1 − oit (dit−1 = J) − oit (dit−1 = J)
� 
Transitions from training or unemployment into employment  Let l denote the labour 
market status in period t − 1, either training T  or unemployment U.  In this case, transitions 
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to employment can only occur if there is an oﬀer and this is a draw from the wage distribution 
determined by the productivity shocks, which follow a distribution N (0,σ0). Transitions into 
employment make the following contribution to the likelihood function, 
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Transitions from training or unemployment into subsidised employment  Following 
the same notation as above, 
Lit(l, J) =  g(d,w) (dit = J, wit|dit−1 = l, Ωit,θi) 
it (dit−1 
� 
1 − Φ 
�
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Transitions from training or unemployment into training  These are also conditional 
on receiving an oﬀer but no wage is drawn, 
Lit(l, T ) =  gd (dit = T |dit−1 = l, Ωit,θi) 
T  it  it  =  oit (dit−1 = l) 
� 
1 − Φ 
�




Transitions from training or unemployment into unemployment  Following the same 
notation as before, 
Lit(l, U) =  g(d,w) (dit = U|dit−1 = l, Ωit,θi) 
=  o 
E  = l) 
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Overall likelihood  The overall likelihood for the conditional sample of individuals entering 
unemployment at time t = 1 is 
N �  T
⎡ 
Lit (l, l�)
1(dit=l�,dit−1=l) ∗ fΩt Ωt−1,dt−1,θ (Ωit Ωit−1,dit−1,θ) ∗ 
⎤ 
L  = 
�  � �
⎣ 
| | ⎦ dθ 
i=1  θ∈Θ t=2l,l�=U,E,J,T  fΩ1 d0,d1,θ (Ωi1 di0 = E, di1 = U, θ) ∗ fθ d0,d1 (θ di0 = E, di1 = U) | |	 | |
In  the  present  case  we  consider  a  discrete  distribution  for  the  unobserved  heterogene­
ity.  This means that the integral in the above expression can be replace by a summation. 
We  also  consider  a  deterministic  evolution  of  the  observable  variables  conditional  on  the 
previous  period  information,  so  fΩt|Ωt−1,dt−1,θ (Ωit|Ωit−1,dit−1,θ)  is  excluded  from  the  likeli­
hood function.  At this stage we are also taking the initial conditions as exogeneous so that 
fΩ1|d0,d1,θ (Ωi1|di0 = E, di1 = U, θ) is not included in the likelihood function. This will be relaxed 




 L  =	
���  � 
Lit (l, l
�) fθ|d0,d1 (θ|di0 = E, di1 = U) 
i=1 θ∈Θ t=2l,l�=U,E,J,T 
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Data sources 
The estimation of the structural model relies on the availability of a particularly rich data set, 
which follows workers through a long period and allows one to link earnings information to 
employment, programme and unemployment spells.  We exploited a uniquely comprehensive 
combination of both new and updated series of datasets.  This involved linking the various 
types of available information, summarised in Table C1, both over time (from January 1990 to 
December 1998) and across labour market states (spells in education, employment, compen­
sated and uncompensated unemployment, programme participation and inactivity). 
Unemployment and programme participation histories are provided by the various databases 
of H¨ andel, the unemployment register. This longitudinal event history dataset, available from 
August 1991 to June 2000, has information on all unemployed individuals registered at the 
public employment oﬃces and provides labour market status information over time (e.g.  un­
employed, on a given programme, temporarily employed), together with important personal 
characteristics of the job-seeker and the reason for leaving the employment oﬃce (e.g. obtained 
employment, gone on regular education or left the workforce). 
Akstat, available from January 1994 to June 2000, originates from the unemployment in­
surance funds and provides information on spells of unemployment beneﬁts, including the type 
(UI or KAS where KAS is cash assistance and is unrelated to previous earnings) and amount 
of compensation paid out. 
Employment information by employment and calendar year is available from the Kontrolluppgifts­
registry from 1990 to 1998.  This information is provided by each employer for tax purposes 
and contains the ﬁrst and last calendar months where the worker has been employed by that 
employer as well as the corresponding employment income paid out to him during that period. 
The highest educational qualiﬁcation achieved within a given calendar year (1990 to 1998) 
56 together with other demographic information is obtained from Statistics Sweden. 
The end result is a very large and representative dataset, with information about the du­
ration of stay in a labour market state, employment earnings, an array of demographic and 
human capital variables and, for entitled individuals, additional information on type of enti­
tlement, unemployment beneﬁt recipiency and previous working conditions. 
Data issues 
Despite the comprehensiveness of the data, a number of important shortcomings had to be 
dealt with to construct the dataset for analysis. 
The  ﬁrst  problem  relates  to  the  availability  of  information  while  out  of  the  unemploy­
ment register (H¨ andel).  H¨ andel is the most reliable data source but it contains no additional 
information about individuals labour market status in between registration periods beyond 
the initial state to which the individual moves upon leaving the oﬃce.  Furthermore, the at­
trition/misclassiﬁcation problem of individuals being recorded as having left simply because 
“contact ended” means that we do not know whether they have found a job they did not 
report, or are still in (unregistered) unemployment (cf.  Bring and Carling, 2000, and Sianesi, 
2004). 
The  employment  information  reported  by  employers  has  been  used  to  ﬁll  in  such  gaps. 
However, it is in itself not free of problems.  First, employment spells recorded in the data 
are not necessarily uninterrupted; we only know that an individual has been paid at least in 
the ﬁrst and last months recorded by that employer but we cannot ascertain for sure whether 
the worker has been paid in the intermediate period unless he/she re-registers as unemployed 
or participates in a programme.  Second, and potentially more serious, is the occurrence of 
employment spells with missing start and end dates and whose income is thus unallocated 
over the calendar year.  The incidence of such spells is low (2-3% of total spells) but they 
aﬀect 20% of our sample individuals. Based on a number of exploratory analysis, our preferred 
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procedure has been to spread these spells over the whole year for as long as the worker is 
not reported as being in registered unemployment or on a programme.  A third problem with 
the employment data relates to the suspected over-reporting of January-to-December spells. 
Again, these spells have been interrupted for eventual periods in registered unemployment or 
on programmes. 
We  detect  participation  in  education  using  outﬂows  from  registered  unemployment  into 
education and from upgrades to the highest qualiﬁcation.  However, the incidence of missing 
information for the “reason to leave registered unemployment” together with the fact that 
educational data are censored at the end of 1998 (and therefore, ongoing investments cannot 
be determined) imply that some upgrades and educational spells will be missed. 
Once cleaned and merged, the data suﬀer from the following shortcomings: 
•	 Low consistency of information from the various sources, in particular:  (i) time in em­
ployment according to H¨ andel and to the employer-provided data (10% of employment 
spells in the latter are not compatible with unemployment or programme participation 
reported in H¨ andel); (ii) monthly income from Akstat and the one derived from the an­
nual payments reported by employers; (iii) highest educational attainment at the time of 
registering as unemployed from H¨ andel and in that calendar year from Statistics Sweden 
(good correspondence at the compulsory and secondary levels, but not at the tertiary 
one);  and (iv)  unemployment compensation according to Akstat and H¨ andel (21% of 
monthly spells where individuals receive compensation are not compatible with states 
measured in H¨ andel). 
To deal with these inconsistencies, priority has been given to the most reliable data source 
in a given case, and further decisions taken on the basis of exploratory and cross-checking 
analyses which also involved the use of additional data sources (in particular, Louise and 
education data from compulsory school  Grundskola). 
58 •	 Deﬁnition of an individual’s labour market state in a given month:  it is not straight­
forward to reliably specify the state in which an individual is in a given month,  this 
being especially the case for education and employment, for which no monthly data is 
available. Further conceptual issues relate to how to treat part-time employment whilst 
registered at the unemployment oﬃce.  Based on exploratory analysis (e.g.  the income 
they earn is substantial compared to income earned on other employment spells) and 
the institutional  treatment of part-time  employment (which counts towards renewing 
eligibility to UI just as full-time employment does), we have decided to treat part-time 
employment as full-time employment.  However, part-time employed workers do receive 
unemployment compensation and have preferential access to programmes as compared 
to deregistered individuals. 
•	 Computation of monthly employment income:  while employment income would be per­
fectly apportioned over a calendar year (conﬁrmed also by the very good correspondence 
between total employment income in that calendar year and income from the Louise 
dataset), it is diﬃcult to apportion employment income exactly over calendar months 
due to the lack of reliable measures of the spell durations mentioned above. 
Data preparation and set-up 
Obvious  mistakes  giving  rise  to  negative  spells  in  H¨ andel  have  been  corrected  and  the  re­
maining individuals with at least a negative spell have later been dropped from the sample 
(this amounted to less than 4% of the original sample).  Before being merged, the data has 
been reshaped into calendar month history, taking the labour market state that lasted longest 
in a month as the reference state for that month.  The employer-provided data on employ­
ment spells has been corrected based on unemployment and programme spells information in 
H¨ andel.  Monthly income from employment has then been calculated based on the corrected 
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employment spells and taking into account overlapping spells with diﬀerent employers. 
The following adjustments have also been made to set-up the data for estimating the model: 
•	 Treatment spells:  we only consider “long” programmes,  i.e.  those lasting more than 
2 months.  If a programme spell lasts 2 or fewer months,  it is considered as time in 
unemployment; if it lasts 3 months, one extra month on the programme is added; and 
if it lasts more than 4 months, it is split up into shorter programme spells of 4 months 
each. 
•	 Direct employment-to-programme transitions: these occur in less than 0.2% of the transi­
tions on a monthly basis and are therefore prevented by including an intermediate period 
in unemployment. 
•	 Employment with no income: given the data limitations highlighted above, employment 
is a residual category for when an individual is not registered as unemployed or taking 
part  in  a  programme.  In  terms  of  history  before  inﬂow,  employment  spells  with  no 
corresponding income are set to unemployment; after inﬂow, employment or subsidised 
employment  spells  with  no  corresponding  income  are  censored  from  the  moment  the 
individual enters the spell. 
•	 Entitlement to unemployment insurance: over our analysis window, we consider individ­
uals as becoming eligible to 14 months of UI after being in employment or treatment for 
4 months. The following variables have been created to capture these factors: 
–	 Work experience:  set to 0 in January 1990,  experience is then calculated as the 
cumulated number of months in employment till then. 
–	 Months in employment or treatment to count towards renewing full eligibility: num­
ber of months in employment or treatment since the last time the individual has 
started an unemployment spell being fully entitled to the 14 months of UI. 
60 –	 Remaining months of UI eligibility: varies between 0 to 14 and is used up while in 
unemployment. 
Sample selection 
The original dataset covered the population registering at an unemployment oﬃce between 1 
August 1991 and 31 December 1998, with no occupational handicap and aged 16 to 30 (age 
being deﬁned as year of registering minus year of birth). 
For our analysis we have selected the population of Swedish males registering at an unem­
ployment oﬃce during 1996 (note that from January 1996 individuals can no longer become 
eligible to UI for the ﬁrst time via a programme) as either full-time unemployed or to take 
part in a programme.  Individuals are then followed until December 1998, and their history 
is known back to January 1990.  Additionally, at the time of registering individuals had to 
be aged 26-30 and have either compulsory education or 1-2 years of high school (60% of the 
full inﬂow sample; educational attainment has been derived from Statistics Sweden under the 
assumption that courses ﬁnish in May).  The selected individuals are further observed not 
to upgrade their educational level during the analysis window (representing over 93% of the 
low-education individuals), never to have an occupational handicap (over 98% of original sam­
ple), never to be self-employed or sailors, never to have a negative spell (after corrections of 
obvious mistakes, over 96% of the original sample), and never to be in programmes for older, 
disabled or immigrant workers, in vocational rehabilitation or in self-employment grants.  We 
have further dropped from the sample individuals with UI at inﬂow but no compensation left 
(less than 2%), as well as individuals not entitled to UI compensation at inﬂow but who fulﬁl 
the eligibility criteria (20% of the sample). 
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Table 17: Parameter estimates

estimates  st. errors

Wage equation 
intercept: low productivity  8.749  0.010 
intercept: medium productivity  9.558  0.010 
intercept: high productivity  9.909  0.010 
log experience  0.039  0.001 
previous subsidised employment  0.001  0.001 
previous training  0.000  0.000 
Unobserved heterogeneity: tastes for employment 
low taste for employment(*)  53.610  102.692 
high taste for employment(*)  136.730  469.323 
Job oﬀers 
previous labour market status: unempl.  -1.552  0.001 
previous labour market status: subs. empl.  -0.504  0.065 
previous labour market status: training  -1.531  0.011 
region 1: rural  0.188  0.001 
region 2: other (not city or rural)  0.048  0.001 
past subs. job spells  -0.107  0.001 
past training spells  0.069  0.000 
Subsidised employment oﬀers 
previous labour market status: unempl.  -4.675  0.093 
previous labour market status: subs. empl.  -0.194  0.958 
previous labour market status: training  -3.656  0.276 
region 1: rural  0.432  0.071 
region 2: other (not city or rural)  0.019  0.066 
past subs. job spells  -0.932  0.207 
past training spells  0.577  0.068 
(*) Although these parameters appear as insigniﬁcant, we have added a set of parameters at a time and the likelihood 
ratio test showed they are statistically signiﬁcant (for a discussion of the problems with the estimation of standard 
errors for non-linear functions by the maximum likelihood method, see Gregory and Veale, 1985). 
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estimates  st. errors

Training oﬀers 
previous labour market status: unempl.  -2.777  0.020 
previous labour market status: training  -18.293  - (**) 
region 1: rural  0.308  0.015 
region 2: other (not city or rural)  0.051  0.016 
past subs. job spells  -0.000  0.039 
past training spells  0.986  0.020 
remaining eligibility time: less than 3m  0.860  0.023 
Distribution of the error terms 
st. error prod. shock if out of empl.(inverse)  2.012  0.000 
st. error prod. shock if in empl.(inverse)  2.331  0.000 
probability of wage innovation  0.098  0.000 
st. error taste shock to empl. (inverse)  0.003  0.000 
st. error taste shock to subs. empl. (inverse)  0.002  0.000 
st. error taste shock to training (inverse)  0.004  0.000 
Distribution of unobserved heterogeneity(***) 
low prod / low taste for E group  0.051  0.000 
low prod / high taste for E group  0.032  0.000 
medium prod / low taste for E group  0.234  0.001 
high prod / low taste for E group  0.171  0.001 
high prod / high taste for E group  0.001  0.000 
(**) This parameter leads to an oﬀer probability of 1 and it becomes impossible to estimate the standard error. 
(***) These are the parameters determining the weights, not the actual weights. 
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